An opposition in pieces

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Pas, widely regarded as the strongest party within PN, could emerge as the principal opposition force, while Bersatu and the other component parties decide their next move. Photo for illustrative purposes only.

PN’s deregistration poses a defining question for Malaysia’s opposition, whether Pas can unite a fractured front into a credible force capable of holding the government to account and offering voters a viable alternative.

MALAYSIA can have an opposition without an opposition coalition.

What it cannot afford is an opposition so divided that it struggles to hold the government accountable or offer voters a credible alternative.

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The distinction is important following the Registrar of Societies’ decision to cancel Perikatan Nasional’s (PN) registration.

The move raises questions not only about the future of the coalition, but also about the ability of its component parties to work together when their common political platform is no longer in place.

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The end of a registered coalition does not mean the end of opposition politics. Pas, Bersatu and other parties remain political forces in their own right, with their own supporters, priorities and parliamentary representatives.

They can continue to question government policies, scrutinise legislation and raise concerns over public spending without belonging to the same coalition.

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But the ability to oppose the government individually is not the same as the ability to challenge it collectively.

A coalition provides a framework for coordinating political strategies, negotiating electoral seats and agreeing on common positions.

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Without it, parties must find other ways to cooperate, even when their interests or ambitions conflict. If they fail to do so, the opposition risks becoming a collection of competing parties rather than a coherent political alternative.

Pas, widely regarded as the strongest party within PN, could emerge as the dominant opposition force.

Its organisational strength and electoral base may give it greater influence in shaping the direction of opposition politics.

Yet being the biggest party does not automatically make it capable of uniting others behind a common agenda.

Pas must decide whether to work with other parties or pursue a more independent path.

Its potential partners, meanwhile, must consider whether cooperation offers them a meaningful role or leaves them overshadowed by a stronger ally.

The consequences could be particularly evident at the ballot box.

Opposition parties contesting the same constituency risk splitting their votes, allowing another candidate to win without securing a majority.

Such an outcome is not inevitable.

Parties can negotiate seat arrangements and cooperate on specific issues without forming a formal coalition.

But these arrangements require trust, discipline and a willingness to compromise.

The opposition’s parliamentary responsibilities remain just as important.

Individual MPs can scrutinise ministers and challenge government decisions regardless of their party affiliations.

However, without common priorities, opposition parties may struggle to sustain pressure on the government or offer voters a clear alternative in policy and governance.

Malaysia has seen how internal disagreements can unravel political alliances.

Pakatan Rakyat collapsed in 2015 after differences among its component parties became irreconcilable, while Bersatu’s withdrawal from Pakatan Harapan in 2020 contributed to the collapse of the government.

PN’s predicament is different because it involves regulatory intervention, but the underlying question of political cooperation remains relevant.

As Malaysia approaches its next general election, voters will need more than parties that can criticise the government.

They will need to know what those parties would do differently and whether they can work together to deliver their promises.

PN’s deregistration may force the opposition to reconsider how it organises itself. It does not necessarily need to recreate the same coalition, but it must find a way to preserve effective scrutiny, coordinate where necessary and offer credible choices.

The real test is not whether Malaysia has an opposition coalition, but whether its opposition can work together well enough to hold the government accountable and convince voters it is ready to govern.

Malaysia can have an opposition without an opposition coalition. What it cannot afford is an opposition so divided that it struggles to hold the government accountable or offer voters a credible alternative.

The Registrar of Societies’ decision to cancel PN's registration has brought that question into sharp focus.

Announced on October 20, the decision follows a complaint by Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) over its exclusion from a PN Supreme Council meeting and questions about its membership status.

RoS said PN’s response to its show-cause notice failed to rebut the grounds for cancellation under the Societies Act 1966.

PN had earlier pursued legal action against the suspension of its activities, with the implications of the latest decision subject to further legal proceedings.

So, what happens now? The parties, their supporters and their parliamentary representatives remain.

What is in question is whether they can coordinate their political strategies and negotiate electoral arrangements without a common platform.

Pas, widely regarded as the strongest party within PN, could emerge as the principal opposition force, while Bersatu and the other component parties decide their next move.

The challenge is whether parties with different ideologies and priorities can fulfil that role while pursuing their own political interests.

Pas may lead, but can it unite?

Pas is well placed to assert itself as the dominant opposition party.

Its organisational reach and established electoral base give it a substantial platform to shape the opposition’s direction.

But being the strongest party does not automatically make it the leader of a wider opposition.

Pas must decide whether to build working arrangements with other parties or pursue a more independent path.

Bersatu and the other parties, meanwhile, must decide whether cooperation serves their interests better than going it alone.

A dominant party may seek to maximise its influence rather than accommodate smaller partners, which may resist arrangements that leave them with little say over strategy, candidate selection or policy priorities.

The dispute that preceded PN’s deregistration illustrates the risks when coalition partners cannot resolve their differences.

Any replacement coalition would need clear rules, agreed decision-making processes and a willingness to compromise. Otherwise, the same tensions could resurface under a different banner.

The electoral consequences could be more immediate.

Without coordination, Pas, Bersatu and other opposition parties could end up competing for the same voters rather than concentrating their efforts against government candidates.

They can still negotiate seat arrangements or cooperate on selected issues without a formally registered coalition, but such agreements require trust and discipline.

Malaysia has seen opposition alliances collapse before.

Pakatan Rakyat fell apart in 2015 after disagreements between its component parties became irreconcilable.

The fall of the Pakatan Harapan government in 2020, following Bersatu’s withdrawal from the coalition, demonstrated how internal fractures can alter the balance of power.

PN’s predicament adds a regulatory dimension to that familiar problem.

A fragmented opposition does not automatically make the government less accountable.

Individual MPs can scrutinise ministers, challenge legislation and raise constituency concerns regardless of whether their parties belong to a coalition.

Parliamentary oversight also depends on access to information, committee scrutiny and the willingness of MPs to question decisions on their merits.

But without common priorities, opposition parties may spend more time competing with one another than examining the government’s performance.

They may agree that a policy is flawed but disagree over how to challenge it, leaving voters with criticism but no coherent alternative.

This matters as Malaysia approaches its next general election.

Voters need to know not only what opposition parties oppose, but what they would do differently, how they would govern and whether they can work together to deliver their promises.

The ability to mobilise support is not the same as the ability to build a governing arrangement.

PN’s deregistration is a test of the opposition’s capacity to adapt. Pas may emerge as its leading force, but the wider opposition’s future will depend on whether its parties can cooperate despite their competing ambitions.

They do not necessarily need to recreate PN in its previous form. They do, however, need to maintain meaningful parliamentary scrutiny, avoid unnecessary electoral fragmentation and offer voters credible choices without a formal umbrella.

Malaysia does not need a coalition merely for the sake of having one.

It needs an opposition capable of holding the government accountable and convincing voters that it is prepared to govern in its place.